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Control of violence—A view on the concept of control 
Kontrolle der Gewalt – Ein Blick auf das Konzept der Kontrolle 
 
Zusammenfassung: 
Künftig werden wir mit einem zunehmenden Verlust an Kontrolle über Gewalt 
konfrontiert werden 
 
Dies ist die zentrale Hypothese, die derzeit durch die Arbeit der Forschungsgruppe ›Kontrolle 
der Gewalt‹ näher beleuchtet wird. Da jedoch die Auseinandersetzung mit einer derart 
weitgefassten und noch wenig spezifischen Annahme so gut wie unmöglich erscheint, bringt 
die Herausforderung, diese Hypothese zu untersuchen, zunächst einmal die Notwendigkeit 
mit sich, sie weiter einzuschränken. Aufgrund dessen wird der Gewaltbegriff durch eine 
Fokussierung auf drei exemplarische Phänomene begrenzt. Es handelt sich hierbei um die 
Phänomene Schulamoklauf, Terrorismus sowie Gewalt innerhalb ›fragiler‹ Staaten. Das 
bedeutet, die Forschungsgruppe untersucht individuelle und kollektive Formen der Gewalt in 
Gesellschaften innerhalb und außerhalb Europas. Im Zentrum unseres Gewaltverständnisses 
steht also die direkte physische Gewalt, die auf Schädigung, Verletzung oder Tötung abzielt, 
also manifest und meistens auch intendiert ausgeübt wird. 
Sich mit der Frage nach einer Kontrolle von Gewalt zu beschäftigen, ist zunächst einmal ein 
noch eher unklares und unspezifisches Unterfangen, da der Begriff der Gewaltkontrolle sehr 
weit gefasst ist und in unterschiedlicher Weise verstanden werden kann. 
Aus diesem Grund soll der vorliegende Aufsatz Aufschluss darüber geben, wie das Konzept 
der Kontrolle für die Untersuchung der hier betrachteten Gewaltphänomene genutzt werden 
kann. Hierzu erfolgt zu Beginn eine detaillierte Beschreibung des Konzeptes, indem eine 
Definition des Kontrollbegriffs angeboten, das Kontrollparadigma erläutert sowie mögliche 
Relationen zwischen Kontrolle und Gewalt und relevante Analyseeinheiten beschrieben 
werden. Abschließend wird die Hypothese, dass wir künftig mit einem zunehmenden Verlust 
an Kontrolle über Gewalt konfrontiert werden, weiter expliziert. 
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I The framework 
 
In future we will face an increasing loss of control over violence. 
 
This is the guiding hypothesis of the research group ‘Control of Violence’. As this is quite a 
broad and still unspecified assumption, the challenge of analysing this hypothesis consists in 
narrowing its content and thus, focussing on three exemplary phenomena of violence. These 
phenomena are school shootings, terrorist attacks and forms of violence in the context of 
‘fragile’ states. Hence, the research group investigates individual and collective violence in 
the present-day Europe and outside Europe. Violence is thereby understood as a process of 
inflicting physical harm to others. 
The starting point is a critical analysis of evolutions at the beginning of the 21st century. 
Given the growing importance of school shootings, the changing character of post 9/11 
terrorism and the inner-state violence of societies in which the monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force is not assured, one can assume that those are especially phenomena that are 
caused and may cause certain losses of control. Firstly, in all fields we can observe extreme 
variations of individual, collective and state violence. Secondly, one may find hardly any 
warning signals, especially with regard to school shootings and terrorism. Moreover, there is a 
lack of knowledge about the trigger causes of these phenomena and the motivations of the 
perpetrators respectively. In the case of violence in fragile states, warlords and violent self-
help groups, for instance, get into the position to establish their own norms and violent 
activities leaving little room to control them. Violence in such contexts, especially, seems to 
be rather at random and arbitrary. In all three fields the rules of social live are extremely 
weakened. 
But the control paradigm is not an easy one as it is rather broad and unspecific. Following 
that, the article gives first insights into the way the concept of control can be used when 
analysing the phenomena of violence under investigation. The next section aims to give a 
more nuanced understanding of the concept of control by suggesting a definition of control, 
elucidating the paradigm, and discussing possible relationships between control and violence 
as well as certain units of analysis. Finally, the hypothesis that in future we will be facing an 
increasing loss of control over violence is explicated. 
II. The concept of control 
1. The notion and definition of control 
The idea of a non-violent society has never been realistic, nor is it now. This also applies to 
so-called developing countries, and especially to societies in transition. A greater or lesser 
incidence of violence between individuals, collectives or states always exists. Nonetheless, 
people have not and will not abandon their hopes and efforts to at least contain the potential 
for violence. This is being tried by influencing socialization and distribution processes, by a 
state monopoly of violence to penalize breaches of norms, or by international law. Thus the 
concept of control has a thoroughly positive ring, at least when the point is to limit destructive 
power through violence by individuals, groups or state institutions. ‘Keeping under control’ 
has a soothing effect on those who are on the side of those being protected. On the other hand 
‘out of control’ signals a threat in every respect. 
However, control is an extremely ambivalent category. Control is based on superior power. 
This can assume various forms: the power of definition, physical power, legal power, or 
military power. Those who control hold sway over others and, as individuals, over themselves 
as well. And from a state perspective control is geared to enforcing a particular order as it is 
defined. It is a category whose effect or aim is to prevent any undesirable behaviour. It ranges 
from social control via state control to international control and employs various means, 
including collective mistrust, repression and the legal process. 
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In turn, forms of control retroact on the controlling societies. Control has different political 
functions. It is manifested in different ways, depending on whether it is restricted by the rule 
of law or is exercised in an authoritarian and dictatorial manner. It may lead to a massive 
increase in repressive organs or to an intensified logic of reprisal. It can be supported by 
majority opinion or be shaped by limited groups and their interests. In any case, control is not 
a neutral element in societies. 
The understanding of control focuses on measures in processes and interactions by several 
actors, e.g. individual perpetrators, collectives or state institutions to contain (limit) violent 
activities. 
Measures of control e.g. by law, punishment, security checks, etc. can succeed in containing 
(limiting) violence (as status quo) but will have unclear effects if there are other sources of 
violence. Thus, three categories have to be included in a common understanding of a concept 
for ‘Control of Violence’. The core category is containment in the sense of limitation to be 
able to avoid increasing violence. This core category has to be put into relation to reducing or 
increasing violence. 
One example: Under what conditions does punishment by incarceration, e.g. in the case of 
juvenile violence, contain the amount of violence—or represent a contribution to increasing 
the number of acts or perpetrators? In relation to the other elements of the ‘Control of 
Violence’ concept the assumption is that the measure will neither have effects to reduce 
violence nor can it remove it. 
2. Paradigm of control 
The main idea of the research group is that control may be used as a strategy to limit violence 
not universally but in specific constellations, by certain actors and against certain forms of 
violence. Projects that deal with present-day violence as well as historical studies should give 
emphasis to specific constellations in which control interventions are developed and 
implemented—and whether they succeeded or failed. The focus is not on a final stage of a 
controlled society as in GEORGE ORWELL’s 1984 but on policies of control, their mechanisms 
and ambivalence. 
In this field we could refer to two extreme positions. On the one hand, NORBERT ELIAS argues 
that with the process of civilization and the trickling down of the standards of civilization the 
mechanisms of self-control are enforced and established as a cultural norm. In his view this 
development of progressive self-control is in itself one of the consequences of a broader 
process of structural changes: the establishment of the state monopoly of financial and 
military power during the period of state building. Even in his more historical works ELIAS 
relies on these assumptions. He explains terrorism in West Germany in terms of opposition 
against the monopolising of social positions by the older generation which is blocking the 
social mobility of the younger generation and by the failure of the school system to teach non-
violent behaviour and conflict resolution. This position stresses the success of the state in 
imposing norms of behaviour and ensuring successful self-control and identifies sectors in 
which this form of control could be established better—by schools for instance. MAX WEBER, 
on the other hand, formulated a much more pessimistic view. In his opinion the state is always 
too late, it can only repair and restore order, but is not capable of prevention. The position of 
the ZiF research group would be somewhere in-between. We are looking at fields where 
control is deficient—school shootings, terrorism, international organisations—but do not 
exclude the possibility that more control might be possible, even if it might have ambivalent 
effects. 
Among the constellations in which control policy is developed we might distinguish those 
where the state is aiming for total control of individual life. Periods of war—especially total 
war—are relevant here, but also times when regimes with totalitarian goals are developing. 
Here the question of what can be controlled emerges. There are evident limits for control 
practices and mechanisms. One obvious actor of control are institutions which touch on every 
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individual like schools, media to a certain extent, military service, and religion to a certain 
extent, even public vocabulary and images. Groups and their structures and organisational 
patterns are also targets of control policies which function through infiltration, strict 
supervision, personal networking and creation of more hierarchical structures. Territories and 
spaces inside societies are also exposed to control policies: residential quarters and housing, 
public spaces and means of transport. Control is also exercised through terms that are used to 
describe reality. The debate whether terrorists are called criminals or freedom fighters, 
enemies or adversaries taking place in several countries is a telling example of the struggle 
over the control of language. Governments tend to criminalize the terrorists and those, in turn, 
try to develop a legitimizing terminology. On the other side, difficulties to catalogue, attribute 
to causes or other phenomena or to designate a violent phenomenon, can be viewed as forms 
of a loss of control. Societal institutions are not able to situate violence inside the established 
categories of self-description and public discourse. 
Besides state intervention which aims at a total control, in liberal democratic societies respect 
for individual and collective rights and the separation of power place limits on state control 
activities. In schools the rights of scholars and parents conflict with state control of 
socialization. Within certain boundaries groups can develop their own infrastructure and 
develop programmes. Spaces are open for different activities. But there are always situations 
where these boundaries have been transgressed by state power: in the struggle against terrorist 
attacks where the vocabulary of ‘war’ has often been used; often also in situations where 
danger to society has been overdramatized—during ‘moral panics’. The balance between 
prevention of danger and respect for constitutional rights is not fixed and is part of a 
controversial public debate and a subject of political confrontations. It seems that the more the 
liberal democratic state has difficulties to control, the more it takes recourse to 
undifferentiated responses which themselves can provoke new problems for public order and 
the security of the citizen. 
Another field of intervention is that of informal control exercised by groups, organisations or 
families and the public. SPIERENBURG’s general hypothesis is that over the twentieth century 
the mechanisms of informal control have lost importance in relation to the destruction of 
control communities like working class and popular culture, neighbourhoods, family 
cohesion. Here the means of control are of an economic nature or they may refer to common 
heritage or tradition, moral norms, processes of social inclusion and exclusion. This may be a 
European process—a control regime specifically European—but surely it is not a global one. 
The coexistence and contradiction between state control and informal control is especially 
sensitive in ‘failed states’ (and in other stages of development like rebellion, fights for power 
that means in phases of ‘weak states’), and might even lead to new kinds of control regimes: 
in Columbia local and regional political leaders exercise forms of control of individual and 
public life below the level of the state monopoly of violence. It is also arguable that the 
informal control exercised by religious groups is, at least in some parts of the world, even 
more vigorous than in the past: Islamic groups might be cited here as well as evangelical 
religious groups in the United States. Here the aim is to control the whole life of the adherents 
and to motivate them even to sacrifice their life. The informal power of organisations such as 
the mafia or Opus Dei might be cited in this context and contradict a general thesis of a 
shifting of control towards state control. 
What does control mean in this context? Control is an interactive process in which certain 
actors submit others to certain constraints of value or attitude or behaviour in order to be able 
to predict and channel their behaviour and assure the legitimacy and authority of the 
controlling actors. Loss of control would be the failure of certain actors to maintain their 
power in imposing a set of obligatory norms of behaviour on other actors. A loss of 
legitimacy of the controlling actors and unpredictability of the social behaviour of those 
previously under control might be the consequences. 
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It is possible to integrate different actors in this broad definition: the state power, controlling 
groups, organisations, warlords. The main aim of their actions is the symbolic or real 
imposition of a set of norms of behaviour and values to support this behaviour in order to 
maintain (or change) the existing structure of power. Control can have several faces: a 
strategy, an aim, an outcome, a process rather for those defending the status quo as well as for 
those aiming to change it. The aim may be to change the goals of control, the intensity of 
control, the legitimization of control or the actors of control. There are societies in which 
there are conflicting control entrepreneurs, in others there is one authorized and legitimized 
power, generally the state. 
Control is becoming a main policy aim in times of power shifts, social unrest and broad 
anomic phenomena. Control policy is especially sensitive to shocks to the status quo 
perceived and propagated by the media. The perception of phenomena endangering society 
and its power relations is a key element in changing and legitimizing control over different 
sectors and fields. There are different dimensions of control. The time dimension is important. 
Not only are there certain circumstances where control is felt necessary—traditionally after 
bad harvests for instance—but also a time lag between a decision to act and the action itself 
makes it necessary to exercise control. If armed groups are moving very quickly to action, the 
controlling work of spies, informers, propagandists or police is worthless. There are 
traditional spaces of control and ‘contested areas’—ghettos, slums, banlieues—and there are 
particular control problems if these spaces are changing or if groups are acting at a 
territorially undefined level. The less predictable the time, place and aim of actions are, the 
less control may be exercised. 
Controlling activity is not unlimited. What can be controlled are manifestations and forms of 
transmission of values, attitudes, structures of institutions and their supposed or experienced 
effects, certain circumstances and spaces, actor groups and their organisations. Control policy 
tries to react to constellations, but it is only in certain circumstances and political regimes a 
structural policy. The Nazis tried to create controlling institutions rather than to change the 
composition of particular working class territories. It is more difficult to change the time 
regime of a population than to supervise certain days or weeks. In trying to control violence, 
actors may fail. The control ambition is not assured of its success. 
Inside control certain modes can be distinguished: direct state control and indirect control by 
civil society institutions; repressive and preventive control mechanisms. Control over people’s 
behaviour and living conditions can be of a different nature than control over language, 
labelling and representations. Local and regional, national and international control have to be 
analysed in their different mechanisms and effects. The value and establishment of self-
control mechanisms can be considered together with control by institutions. 
3. Relationships between causes, control and violence 
The work concentrates on two issues: First, on the explanation of violence and second, on the 
question of the controllability of the investigated violent phenomena: school shootings, 
terrorism, and economies of violence in failing states. 
Discussion of the relationship between the constructs of ‘violence’ and ‘control’ is thus a 
central aspect of the research work analyzing these phenomena. Initial conceptual 
investigation of the relationship shows that the two constructs do not have one single clearly 
defined relationship to one another, but instead can stand in different relationships. One can 
examine and analyze: 
a) loss of control as the cause of the occurrence of violence or control as a means of 
containing violence, 
b) control of the trigger-mechanisms of violence, and 
c) violence as the cause of a loss of control. 
It must be assumed that the type of analysis of the phenomenon under investigation will be 
decisively influenced depending on which of these potential relationships between the 
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constructs is taken as the basis for investigating the phenomenon. The possible relationships 
between the constructs are described in the following, and the implications of basing analyses 
of shooting sprees, terrorism, and economies of violence on the different relationships are 
briefly outlined. 
3.1 Loss of control as cause of violence 
One option for analyzing the relationship between control and violence is to reveal the 
conditions that precede violent actions and impede or encourage them, examining the 
variation of the controllability of violent actions and the impact of that variation on violent 
activity. The central questions that guide such an analysis are thus: What circumstances exist 
(independently of the phenomena of violence) whose uncontrollability leads to an increase in 
violence? In what ways has the controllability of these conditions changed over time (or is 
changing now) and what is the effect of such variation on the development of phenomena of 
violence? We must also look for indications of change in the controllability of the 
circumstances. Measures applied to control the potential for violence include influencing 
socialization and distribution processes, guaranteeing the state monopoly of violence, and 
establishing international alliances and treaties. To answer the question of whether a loss of 
control leads causally to an increase in violence requires first that indicators for 
ineffectiveness of these control mechanisms be identified—independently of the violence 
construct. The second step is then to explore whether an increase in violence can be attributed 
to a decrease in such control measures. 
In relation to the phenomenon of shooting sprees analyzed at the microsocial level, control 
losses that represent a potential cause of these events are believed to exist both in the field of 
social structures and in individual dispositions (perpetrators), as well as in the interaction 
between the two. So at the sociostructural level we have to analyze whether an erosion of the 
state monopoly of violence and a loss of its civilizing force can be regarded as causal for 
shooting sprees. But in this connection we must not focus exclusively on the state monopoly 
of violence as the controlling instance. CYBELLE FOX and DAVID HARDING, for example, 
underline the control function of the institution of school when they examine the possibilities 
of preventing school shootings in their qualitative study. Using case studies of two schools 
where shootings had taken place, they show that structural deficits in the organization of these 
schools made it more difficult to collect information about social and emotional problems of 
students and consequently information that might have given clues to the shootings was 
overlooked. So the authors describe a loss of control caused by structural disorganization 
within school. MESSNER’s research will consider the effects of institutional and normative 
controls on levels of criminal violence. 
But it may also be possible to identify losses of control at the individual level of the 
perpetrator that could be the cause of shooting sprees. The research group will investigate 
whether the perpetrator’s loss of control over his own life can be the trigger for a shooting 
spree, and whether experiencing a low level of social recognition and the loss of social ties 
leads a person to cease to consider the consequences his own actions will have on others, thus 
making self-control superfluous and lifting the inhibitions on violence. 
In relation to explanations for macrosocial phenomena of violence we can also identify 
circumstances that could have a causal influence on variation in violence. Changes in the 
global system of states bring about economic shifts that destabilize social hierarchies and 
create circumstances where violence is more difficult to control. Furthermore, privatization of 
violence and the associated dissolution of the state monopoly of violence—i.e. a loss of 
control by state instances—can be regarded as causal for an increase in violent activity. 
3.2 Control as the trigger for violence 
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One effect of the ambivalent character of control is that as well as loss of control representing 
a potential cause of violence, the control activity itself can be associated with an increase in 
violence or control can be created through violence (see control balance theory). 
When analyzing control as a trigger of violence we can make a further differentiation between 
two different ways of looking at the question. On the one hand, the experience of being 
controlled by authorities that are perceived as illegitimate is a possible trigger for violent 
action on the part of those controlled. On the other, the use of violence by the controlling 
instances (agents, authorities) themselves is or might become a means of establishing control. 
a. Eliminating control as the goal of violent action 
Control is thus a potential trigger of violent action by the controlled where the legitimacy of 
the controlling instances is regarded as questionable for example in the case of heavy policing 
with respect to British race riots. Depending on whether control is democratically legitimized 
or exercised by an authoritarian dictatorship—in other words, based on the opinion of the 
majority in society or on particular interests—it can lead the controlled either to compliance 
or into opposition whose outcome can be violence. That also means that if control is exercised 
by rulers regarded as illegitimate, they run the risk of provoking violent action. In this case, 
control that is not felt to be legitimate is the cause that provokes violent activity. 
b. Establishing control as the goal of violent action 
As well as control regarded as illegitimate by the controlled provoking violent action, 
violence can also be used in order to achieve or expand control if the controllers regard the 
behavior of the controlled as deviating from desirable norms. This can be observed at the 
individual, collective, and state levels. In relation to the phenomena of violence investigated 
in this research project, the focus in this connection will be especially on the state level. 
Where statehood is threatened or has collapsed we find the use of violence whose goal is to 
establish or maintain control, for example in the case of counter-terrorism. In particular, the 
lack of a state monopoly of violence is associated with attempts to maintain order through 
violent action. 
It should be noted that in this case control is not the cause of violent activity. For where 
control is exerted through violence this is a process driven by its goal rather than the 
circumstances. In other words, the exercise of control is the intended purpose of violent action 
rather than an underlying cause of violence. 
Controlling measures are thus associated with violent action to the extent that they either 
provoke violent reactions or violent action is used as a means to implement them. 
3.3 Violence as the cause of loss of control 
The unpredictability of ethnic or religiously based terrorism, in particular, brings up another 
relationship between the constructs of ‘control’ and ‘violence’ that can be analyzed in relation 
to this phenomenon of violence. Here the experience of violence e.g. exercised by suicide 
bombers is regarded as causal for perceived or real loss of control by potential victims, so we 
have to analyze whether the daily experience of violence brings with it a loss of control. 
When examining this relationship between the two constructs the focus is on the question of 
how the investigated phenomena of violence lead to a real or perceived loss of control by 
potential targets of the violent act. 
This relationship between violence and loss of control needs to be investigated in particular in 
connection with the phenomenon of ethnic or religiously based terrorism, because precisely 
this type of violence appears to produce perceived and real losses of control. Terrorist attacks 
cause loss of control at the individual, collective, and state levels. At the individual level acts 
of terrorism give those affected a feeling of unpredictable threat and consequently the 
inability to plan their own lives. This may produce also a feeling of resignation at the 
collective level. So whereas at the individual and collective levels the perception of a loss of 
control is relevant, at the state level acts of terrorism lead to a real loss of control because the 
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state’s power in relation to state security is restricted and the control mechanisms of the 
nation-state are to a certain extent put out of operation. With respect to the issue of how 
violence can reduce control, research indicates that high homicide rates undermine social 
trust, and decreases in social trust weaken informal social control. 
4. Units of Analysis: Qualitative Structure of Violence and Quantitative Developments 
It is necessary to discuss the relationship between the qualitative structure of particular cases 
and the transformation into quantitative development—embedded in individual reactions in 
the population and the reaction of the state. 
• In the US the number of homicides that involve more victims than one is increasing since 
1976. While in 1976 there were 529 such homicides, ten year later, in 1986, 654 were 
registered. Another ten years later, in 1996, 744 homicides involving multiple victims 
have been recorded. This number firstly decreased in the following years and than again 
increased until the year 2005 to 724. This is a real quantitative development, documented 
by statistics. But what is the qualitative structure behind this? Are there changes in the 
reasons—or is there simply more of the same? 
• The number of acts of terrorism (before the Iraq War) does not increase, although the 
number of victims does. The statistics of the number of acts is only one category 
concerning increasing or decreasing violence. The other important one is the perception 
and subjective interpretation by the population. The act statistics says no increase, but the 
number of victims is increasing and so the perception of a loss of control becomes 
overriding in the population. 
The conclusion: we have to differentiate between objective registration and subjective 
interpretation of loss of control. 
• Concerning the violence in failing states there is another variation. Sometimes the 
question of loss of control is difficult, because in some states an effective state monopoly 
of violence never has existed. In this case the hypothesis of loss of control must be 
considered in relation to the qualitative standard of the state and its private counterparts 
III. Main hypothesis: Increasing loss of control is related to increasing 
violence 
Violence is a resource to which individuals, collectives and states can have recourse at any 
time and which they use, or refrain from using, in line with specific risk assessments. This 
gives rise to the question whether there are signs that individual, collective, state and 
international losses of control are arising or spreading. One must examine whether the diverse 
mechanisms that exist at each instance and level are, for various reasons, in danger of 
becoming ineffective for specific forms of violence. These are especially the mentioned forms 
like school shooters, terrorism and violence in ‘failed states’ with the specific characteristics. 
If so one might justifiably assume that the future of violence could consist of a combination of 
a change in quality and an increasing quantity of acts of violence. 
This leads to unpredictable escalations and violence can no longer be contained adequately by 
the relevant control regimes, such as police, state surveillance institutions, national repression 
apparatuses and international law. 
Moreover, the ambivalence of the control paradigm can also contribute towards an expansion 
of violence if control regimes themselves use violence. In extremis, societies may land in 
situations from which there is simply no way out. They face the economic and logistical 
dilemma of, for instance, only being able to limit the danger of terrorist attacks by markedly 
expanding state and police control mechanisms. This in turn prevents them from controlling 
other areas such as property offences, road traffic, etc. to the extent that meets the standards of 
Western democracies. 
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